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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE l\IETROPOLITAN WATER 
DISTRICT OP SALT LAI{E 
CITY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff~ Respondent and 
Cross-Appellant~ 
vs. 
S A L T Li\J{E CITY, a J\!Iunicipal 
Corporation; J. BRACKEN LEE; 
L. C. ROMNEY~; JOE L. CHRIS-
TENSEN; CONRAD B. HARRI-
SON; HERBERT F. SMART; and 
THORPE B. ISAACSON, 
Defendants~ Appellants and 
Cross-Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Case 
No. 9660 
STATEl\1ENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action by the plaintiff Metropolitan 
'Vater District of Salt Lake City for a declaratory 
judgn1ent interpreting the provisions of the Metropoli-
tan 'Yater District .t\._ct (Chapter 8, Title 73, Utah 
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Code Annotated, 1953) in order to determine the valid-
ity of the appointment of Thorpe B. Isaacson to the 
Board of Directors of plaintiff replacing Charles C. 
Freed, whose alleged term had expired, and the action 
raises two principal questions: 
( 1) What is the term of office of members of the 
Board of Directors of plaintiff Metropolitan 
Water District of Salt Lake City, Utah? 
(2) What is the method of appointment of Direc-
tors to said Board? 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Upon the motions of the respective parties for 
Summary Judgment in their favor, the lower court 
determined in accordance with defendants' contentions 
that the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City has 
the power to fix the term of office of directors of the 
Metropolitan 'Vater District, that it has properly fixed 
this term at four years by ordinance, and that, conse-
quently, the term of office of Director Charles C. Freed 
has expired. However, the court, against the contentions 
of defendants, held that the power to nominate directors 
to the Board of Directors of plaintiff Metropolitan 
Water District of Salt Lake City was vested in the 
Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City rather than 
in the Mayor subject to confirmation by the Board of 
Commissioners, that the purported appointment of 
Thorpe B. Isaacson was null and void, and that Charles 
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C. Freed may continue to hold office until his successor 
is duly appointed by the Board of Commissioners of 
Salt Lake City. The court also declared invalid a portion 
of Section 22-1-2 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt 
Lake City, Utah, 1955, which purports to give the 
Mayor nominating authority with confirming authority 
in the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City. The 
court thereupon refused to issue a Writ of Mandamus 
compelling plaintiff to seat Thorpe B. Isaacson on plain-
tiff's Board of Directors as requested by defendants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants appeal from that portion of the lower 
court's determination which holds that the power to 
nominate directors is in the Board of Commissioners of 
Salt Lake City and that Thorpe B. Isaacson was not 
validly appointed. Defendants ask that these determi-
nations be reversed and tba t this court declare that the 
power to nominate directors to plaintiff Metropolitan 
Water District of Salt Lake City is in the Mayor of 
Salt Lake City subject to confirmation by the Board 
of Connnissioners of Salt Lake City in accordance with 
Section 73-8-20, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and 
Section 22-1-2 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 1955, and respectfully request this court 
to hold that the appointment of Thorpe B. Isaacson 
was in all respects valid and proper. Defendants also 
request that this court issue a Writ of Mandamus con1-
pelling the plaintiff Metropolitan Water District to 
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seat Thorpe B. Isaacson on its Eoard of Directors. 
Plaintiff cross appeals from that portion of the deter-
mination of the lower court which holds that the Board 
of Commissioners of Salt Lake City has power to fix 
a term of office of the directors of plaintiff, from the 
holding that said term was properly fixed at four years~ 
and from the holding that the term of Charles C. Freerl 
has expired. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff Metropolitan Water District of Salt 
Lake City was organized in 1935 pursuant to statutory 
authority granted in the original Metropolitan Water 
District Act enacted by Chapter 110 of the Laws of 
Utah, 1935. The constitutionality of said act was tested 
and upheld in the dual cases of Lehi City v. Meiling~ 
87 Utah 237, 48 P.2d 530, and Provo City v. Evans~ 
87 Utah 292, 48 P.2d 555. The Metropolitan Water 
District of Salt Lake City was organized with the same 
geographical limits as Salt Lake City itself and con-
sequently, plaintiff includes the area of only one muni-
cipality. The section of the original act relating to ap-
pointment to Board of Directors is now found in Section 
73-8-20, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and insofar as 
this law suit is concerned it is in all respects identical 
to the original section. The section provides in part : 
"All powers, privileges and duties vested in or 
iinposed upon any district incorporated here-
under shall be exercised and perfonned by and 
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through a board of directors ; provided, however, 
that the exercise of any and all executive, admin-
istrative and ministerial powers may be by said 
board of directors delegated and redelegated to 
any of the offices created hereby or by the board 
of directors acting hereunder. 
"In the event that the district shall be organ-
ized to comprise the area of two or more cities, 
the board of directors herein referred to shall 
consist of at least one representative from each 
municipality, the area of which shall lie within 
the metropolitan water district. Such representa-
tives shall serve without compensation from the 
district and shall be designated and appointed by 
the chief ewecu,tive officers of municipalities_, re-
spectively_, with the consent and approval of the 
governing bodies of the municipalities~ respec-
tively. * * * 
'"'If any district shall include the area of only 
one municipality then the board of directors shall 
consist of such number as the governing body of 
that rnunicipality shall determine. All provisions 
of this section appropriate shall apply to such 
board.n (Emphasis added.) 
In furtherance of the authority granted by this 
section, the Salt Lake City Board of Commissioners 
on September 12, 1935, adopted an ordinance desig-
nating the number, tenure of office and classifications 
of the members of the Board of Directors of the Metro-
politan Water District of Salt Lake City. (R. 55). 
This ordinance provided that the Board shall consist 
of seven (7) members "one of whom shall be the Com-
missioner of ·vv ater Supply and Waterworks of Salt 
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Lake City and six ( 6) of whom shall be appointed by 
the Mayor and approved by the Board of Commissioners 
of Salt Lake City." (R. 55). This ordinance was re-
pealed in 1941, and a new ordinance enacted which 
changed the number of members of the Board of Direc-
tors to five ( 5) and provided "one of whom shall be the 
Commissioner of Water Supply and Waterworks of 
Salt Lake City and four ( 4) of whom shall be appointed 
by the Mayor subject to the approval and confirmation 
of the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City." 
(R. 56-58). This ordinance was re-enacted in the Re-
vised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1955, as Sec-
tion 22-1-2. (R. 59). Since 1935, all appointments to the 
Board of Directors of plaintiff have been made by the 
Mayor and have been approved and confirmed by the 
Board of Commissioners, and until this controversy 
arose, it was generally assumed by both parties that the 
power to appoint directors to plaintiff was in the Mayor 
subject to approval by the Board of Commissioners 
pursuant to both statutory and ordinance authority. 
(R. 24-26). For example, in 1936, a dispute arose con-
cerning the appointment of Mr. Blair Richardson to 
the Board of Directors. The facts surrounding this 
dispute are not indicated by the minutes of the Salt 
Lake City Commission, but 1\tlayor Erwin's nomination 
of Mr. Richardson was defeated twice on September 
30th and October 1st before being finally confirmed on 
October 6, 1936. (R. 25-27). This serves merely to 
illustrate the fact that since the inception of the district 
until this dispute arose, no one questioned the right 
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of the lYiayor to make the nomination to the Board of 
Directors of the district. 
In accordance with this unquestioned administra-
tive practice of long standing, the nomination of the 
incumbent Charles C. Freed was made by the Mayor 
and confirmed by the Commission. On June 18, 1958, 
Mayor Stewart recommended that Charles C. Freed be 
appointed to fill the unexpired term of Royden G. 
Derrick, for a term ending June 19, 1961. This ap-
pointment was confirmed by the Board of Commis-
siOners as recommended with a unanimous vote. ( R. 
45-46). 
As the end of the term of Charles C. Freed was 
approaching, Mayor J. Bracken Lee made the following 
recommendation on June 15, 1961: 
"From Mayor: 
"Gentlemen: 
I respectfully request that Mr. Oscar K. Carl-
son of 2142 St. Mary's Drive here in Salt Lake 
City be appointed to the Board of Directors of 
the Metropolitan VV ater District. His term is 
to be effective immediately and run the pre-
scribed four years until June of 1965. Mr. Carl-
son's appointment will fill the vacancy caused 
by the expired term of Mr. Charles Freed. 
J. Bracken Lee." 
This nomination failed of confirmation by a vote of 
two in favor and three against. (R. 49-50). On June 
20, 1961, the l\1ayor nominated Julian Bamberger to 
., 
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the Board of Directors of the Metropolitan Water Dis-
trict and his nomination was approved by a vote of four 
to one. ( R. 50) . Mr. Bamberger subsequently refused 
to accept the position and on August 3, 1961, the Mayor 
nominated Thorpe B. Isaacson, one of the defendants 
named herein, to the Board of Directors. His nomina-
tion was approved by a vote of four to zero, with one 
member abstaining. The city commission minutes of 
August 3, 1961, reflect this action as follows: 
"From Mayor: 
''Gentlemen: 
I re~pectfully request that Bishop Thorpe B. 
Isaacson of 4331 Beacon Drive here in Salt Lake 
City be appointed to the Board of Directors of 
the Metropolitan Water District. His term is to 
, be effective immediately and run the prescribed 
four years until June of 1965. Bishop Isaacson's 
appointment will fill the vacancy caused by the 
expired term of l\1r. Charles Freed. 
J. Bracken Lee, Mayor 
"Mr. Harrison stated that he would not vote 
on any appointment to the Metropolitan Water 
District Board to replace Mr. Freed. 'I do not 
feel that I should vote against a good man and 
I cannot vote for the replacement or dismissal of 
Mr. Freed from this Board.' 
"Mr. Lee 1noved that the report be filed, that 
the appointment be approved, effective imme-
diately and to run the prescribed four years until 
June of 1965, which motion carried, all members 
voting aye, except Mr. Harrison, who did not 
vote. 
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"Upon motion of Mr. Smart, the Board of 
Commissioners adjourned. 
lsi .J. BRACKEN LEE, Mayor 
Is/ I-IERl\1AN J. HOGENSEN 
City Recorder" (R. 51). 
This law suit was filed by plaintiff shortly thereafter 
to determine the validity of this appointment. On 
October 13, 1961, a motion of plaintiff for Judgment 
on the Pleadings was denied by the District Court. 
At a later date, plaintiff and defendants joined in re-
spective motions for Summary Judgment resulting in 
the trial court's Preliminary Memorandum Decision 
on the 9th of February, 1962. (R. 63-66). The Court 
determined in his Memorandum Decision that the power 
to nominate members of the Board of Directors of the 
Metropolitan Water District was in the entire City 
Commission rather than in the Mayor, and he suggested 
that another hearing for further argument be arranged. 
Pursuant to this further argument and hearing the trial 
court entered a Summary Judgment on March 30, 
1962, in which he ruled as heretofore stated. (R. 68-69). 
In this brief by defendants, appellants and cross-
respondents only the points raised by defendants' Notice 
of Appeal will be discussed and argued. Defendants, 
appellants and cross-respondents will file a Cross-Re-
spondents' brief in answer to the expected argument of 
plaintiff and cross-appellant on the points raised by 
plaintiff by way of cross appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UNDER SECTION 73-8-20, U.C.A., 1953, 
MEMBERS 0!1-, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
OF PLAINTIFF, ARE TO BE NOMINATED 
BY THE "CHIEF, EXECUTIVE OFFICER'' 
OF SALT LAKE CITY. 
The trial court erroneously determined that the 
portion of the statute relating to appointment by the 
chief executive officer with the consent and approval 
of the governing body did not apply to districts that 
comprise the area of only one city. The court in making 
this determination stated that inasmuch as the governing 
body of the municipality in single-city districts was to de-
termine the number of the representatives of the city on 
the board of directors of said districts, they were also 
to determine the appointment of the directors. It held 
that the last sentence of the statute wherein it provides 
that "all provisions of this section appropriate shall 
apply to such board" was meaningless insofar as it 
relates to the method of appointment of directors. It 
is interesting to note that neither the plaintiff nor the 
defendants urged this construction of section 73-8-20 
upon the trial court. This interpretation was not briefed 
or argued and is the trial court's own novel interpre-
tation of the statute. It will be seen at once that to con-
strue the statute in such manner strains the imagination 
and is an unusual construction of legislative intent, for 
there is nothing in the statute anywhere to indicate 
that the legislature intended that the method of appoint-
tO 
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1nent to a single-city district should be any different 
than the method of appointment to a multiple-city dis-
trict. It should be readily apparent that no such result 
was intended by the legislature. A small change of facts 
in the instant case will demonstrate the lack of logic 
in the trial court's interpretation of the statute. If, in 
this case, Salt Lake City had chosen to join with South 
Salt Lake, Murray, or some other city in the creation 
of a district rather than to form it individually, then 
the method of appointment would be by the chief execu-
tive officer with the consent and approval of the gov-
erning body, but since plaintiff is a single-city district, 
then the regular methods of appointment do not apply. 
Such a distinction finds no support in the act for the act 
provides that "all provisions appropriate" shall apply, 
and the burden should be on plaintiff to show that the 
method of appointment is not a provision appropriate, 
which burden was never sustained by them in the lower 
court. Such distinction as made by the lower court is 
also without reasonable basis, for any reason that there 
111ay be to have the entire governing body do the nomi-
nating in a single-city district applies with equal and 
possibly even greater force to a multiple-city district. 
The clear expression of the applicability of the method 
of appointment set forth in the statute should be applied 
to appointments to the board of directors of plaintiff. 
In reaching its conclusion, the court declared in-
valid a portion of Title 22 of the Revised Ordinances 
of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1955, wherein the Board of 
Commissioners of Salt Lake City had followed the 
11 
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clear mandate of section 73-8-20 and authorized the 
Mayor to nominate members to the board of directors 
of the Metropolitan Water District subject to approval 
and confirmation by the Board of Commissioners. This 
provision of the ordinances, or one substantially similar, 
had been in effect since the incorporation of the district 
in 1935. In declaring this ordinance invalid the lower 
court said: 
" ... This gratuitous procedural rule engrafted 
onto an initiatiatory ordinance is incompatible 
with the third paragraph of the statute; is not 
essential to give effect to the Title as a whole and 
finally puts a function into the mayor's hands 
which the statute intended to place in the hands 
of the city commission. So, it is declared to be 
contrary to the statute upon which it rests, to be 
surplusage in said second section of the ordinance 
and, by its deletion, not to invalidate said Title 
22 of the ordinances of Salt Lake City." (R. 64-
65). 
The ruling of the trial court obviously ignored the 
proper background and framework of authorized judi-
cial construction of statutes and ordinances. It is the 
universal rule that ordinances lawfully and regularly 
passed are presumed to be valid and not invalid and 
that this presumption is strengthened by a lack of chal-
lenge to the ordinance for many years. This proposition 
is well stated by l\!IcQuillan, ]}funicipal Corporations_, 
Vol. 6, Sec. 20.06, p. 13, as follows: 
"Consistently with ,iudicial respect for the 
separation of powers in our government, as dis-
cussed above, there are presumptions of the rea-
12 
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sonableness and constitutionality of ordinances; 
indeed, there ordinarily is a presumption of valid-
ity of ordinances in all respects. At least, when 
offered in proof in proper form, an ordinance is 
presuined to be valid where it has reference to 
a subject matter which is within the corporate 
jurisdiction, unless the contrary appears on the 
face of the ordinance itself. But it has been said 
that this presumption, however strong, is not 
so conclusive as might be supposed. In the last 
analysis, it means only that municipal legisla-
tive action will be sustained if it is possible to 
sustain it under any reasonably supposable state 
of facts. While it has been asserted that the same 
presumption does not exist respecting the regu-
larity of the passage of an ordinance as in the 
case of an act of the legislature, it has been ob-
served, on the contrary, that 'every presumption 
obtains in favor of the validity of an ordinance 
that there is in favor of the validity of an act of 
the legislature.' 
aThe fact that a law is long acquiesced in by 
the publ-ic and treated as valid by various govern-
mental departments generally strengthens the 
presumption of its constitutionality.-'-' (Emphasis 
added.) 
See also Rhyne, Municipal Law, Sec. 9-10, page 238. 
As will be hereinafter demonstrated, it seems that 
the trial court in this case sought a way to overturn this 
ordinance rather than a method to uphold it, for it gave 
no credence to the long-continued administrative prac-
tice and history involved, it failed to give effect to the 
estoppel arising against the present members of the 
board of directors of plaintiff, and it, inconsistently 
13 
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with its own reasoning, upset the determination of the 
city commission of the method of appointment. 
The contemporaneous construction of the statute 
and the long-continued administrative practice and 
procedure regarding the statute and ordinance is alone 
sufficient to sustain the conclusion that the Salt Lake 
City ordinance declared invalid by the trial court is 
the correct and logical interpretation of the statute. 
Such construction and practice is entitled to great weight 
and should not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. 
In the case of Bowman v. Eldher~ 369 P.2d 977 at p. 
978, the Colorado Supreme Court concisely stated this 
general rule as follows: 
"It is our function in interpreting statutes 
or charter provisions to ascertain and carry out 
the intent of the framers thereof. Contempora-
neous construction of legislation, acquiesced in 
for many years by the authorities charged with 
its enforcement, is entitled to great weight in 
determining the intent of the framers. In the 
absence of clear error such a long established 
construction should not be overturned or dis-
regarded by this Court." 
Justice Sutherland makes an equally strong state-
ment in his text on Statutory Construction~ 3rd Edition, 
wherein, relating to the conclusiveness of contempora-
neous and practical construction, he states in sections 
5103 and 5104, Vol. II, pages 512-515, as follows: 
"Long-continued contemporaneous and prac-
tical interpretation of a statute by the executive 
officers charged with its administration and en-
14 
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forcen1ent, the courts, and the public constitutes 
an invaluable aid in determining the meaning 
of a doubtful statute * * * 
'"rhe conclusiveness of a contemporaneous and 
practical interpretation will depend upon a 
nu1nber of additional elements that give efficacy 
to the rule. In general, these elements are: ( 1) 
That the interpretation originated from a reliable 
source; ( 2) That the interpretation has con-
tinued for a long period of time and received 
wide acceptation, and ( 3) That the interpreta-
tion was made at or near the time of the enact-
ment of the statute. "\Vhere these factors are 
present the vagueness usually surrounding the 
other aids of construction are not present, and 
therefore the rule serves as one of the most defi-
nite and reliable sources of statutory meaning." 
In this case the contemporaneous and practical con-
struction fulfills all the elements set forth in Suther-
land. The interpretation arose from both the Board of 
Commissioners of Salt Lake City and the Metropolitan 
Water District, certainly reliable sources, within the 
context of the quote; the interpretation was made simul-
taneously with the adoption of the act and the creation 
of the district in 1935; the interpretation has continued 
ever since and has received universal acceptance until 
the advent of the present controversy. Such interpre-
tation should be well-nigh conclusive in the absence 
of manifest error which has never been shown to exist 
by plaintiff or any other person. 
Plaintiff is also estopped to assert anything con-
trary to this interpretation. Each appointment to plain-
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tiff's board of directors has been made pursuant to Title 
22 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
1955, and each of them has accepted all the benefits 
of appointment thereunder. It would seem, therefore, 
that all of plaintiff's contentions are vulnerable to the 
proposition that one who has accepted benefits under a 
statute or ordinance is ordinarily powerless to question 
its validity. In Salt Lake City Lines v. Salt Lake City_, 
6 Utah 2d 428, 315 P .2d 859, this court said: 
"Throughout the entire history of this matter 
the company, without protest of any kind and 
without any claim that the ordinances were in-
valid, has assumed the burdens and accepted the 
benefits of all three. Now, for the first time, it 
urges that the 1951 ordinance is invalid, ... 
"All of the contentions mentioned seem to be 
vulnerable to the general proposition that one 
accepting the benefits of legislation, ordinarily is 
speechless in denouncing its validity, even on 
constitutional grounds." 
The words of this court apply to plaintiff in respect to 
its contentions in this case ·with equal force, for each 
member of plaintiff's board of directors has accepted 
the benefits of office under said ordinance and statute, 
and now for the first time challenges the validity of said 
ordinance, seeking to perpetuate himself in those bene-
fits arising from his individual acceptance of appoint-
ment thereunder. As a matter of fact, plaintiff takes a 
strange position in this case, for if defendant Isaacson 
has not been validly appointed, neither has any other 
member of the board of directors of plaintiff district, 
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including the incumbent Charles C. ~-,reed, for all ap-
pointments to said board were made in the identical 
manner as the appointment of defendant Isaacson. This 
fact is clearly shown without any room for argument 
in the motion of defendants for sum1nary judgment and 
the affidavits attached thereto. 
POINT II. 
THE MAYOR IS THE "CHIEF EXECU-
TIVE OFFICER" OF SALT LAKE CITY. 
It should be noted that the lower court never actually 
determined this point inasmuch as it held that the pro-
visions of the statute relating to appointment by the 
chief executive officer was not applicable to single-city 
districts. However, since this court should determine 
that this portion of the statute is applicable to plaintiff 
in accordance with defendants' argument under Point 
I, then the court must determine who is the "chief 
executive officer" of Salt Lake City. Plaintiff through-
out the hearings on the respective motions in this case 
argued that the mayor was not such, since Salt Lake 
City is a city of the first class operating with a commis-
sion form of government. Plaintiff's argument was that 
the Board of Commissioners was Salt Lake City's 
"chief executive officer." Such argument does violence 
to the language of the statute, for it renders meaning-
less certain portions of the statute. This can be readily 
illustrated by a substitution of ·words in the statute 
itself. If the statute were to read in accordance with 
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the contentions of plaintiff, it would read "such rep-
resentatives shall be designated and appointed by the 
Board of Commissioners with the consent and approval 
of the Board of Commissioners," and the last section 
would be simply repetitious. But for the statute to read 
in accordance with defendants' contentions that "such 
representatives shall be designated and appointed by 
the Mayor with the consent and approval of the Board 
of Commissioners" would give effect to all the language 
in the statute. In the case of Stevenson v. Salt Lake City~ 
7 Utah 2d 28, 317 P.2d 597, this court held that every 
word of a statute must be given effect, if possible to do 
so. In that case the question was whether the word "pro-
hibit" meant something other than "suppress." This 
court held that since the word "prohibit" was used in 
conjunction with the word "suppress" in one section of 
the statute and the word "suppress" was used alone 
in another section of the statute, the two words were 
not synonymous and the power to "suppress" did not 
include authority to "prohibit." So in this case to give 
effect to all the language in section 73-8-20 someone 
other than the Board of Commissioners must be the 
"chief executive officer" of a first class city for there 
can be no doubt that it is the "governing body." The 
only possible person to whom the act could refer as 
"chief executive officer" is the mayor of Salt Lake 
City. It is true that in Salt Lake City the mayor does 
not have the executive and administrative power that 
a person with the same title may have in a different 
type government, but that by statute the mayor's office 
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has been made a more important office than the office 
of comiuissioner admits of no argument. Sections 
10-6-1 and 10-6-7, lJ.C.A., 1953, provide that the mayor 
shall be elected separately from the other commission-
ers; section 10-6-41 authorizes a higher salary for the 
1nayor than for the other commissioners; section 10-6-33 
gives the mayor the authority to approve the bonds 
of the other commissioners. In addition, Section 10-6-13, 
U.C.A., 1953, provides that the mayor is to be the 
chail'lnan of the Board of Commissioners and shall 
sign all resolutions and ordinances passed by the board. 
According to 'Vebster's Unabridged Dictionary, one 
of the definitions of execute is to sign and deliver, and 
at least in this term of reference, the mayor is the 
"chief" executive officer of Salt Lake City. Statutes 
1nust be interpreted in accordance with their most rea-
sonable interpretation, and the mere fact that the 
n1ayor's office does not encompass all authority that is 
ordinarily contemplated in connection with the term 
"chief executive" should not deter this court from inter-
preting the act in accordance with its most reasonable 
construction. In City of Clifton v. Zweir~ 36 N.J. 309, 
177 A.2d 545, the New Jersey Supreme Court was 
confronted with a similar problem of definition when 
the statute defined the person who was to appoint and 
also to serve as the "elected official who serves as the 
chief executive of the municipality, whatever his official 
designation may be." The question was whether this 
person was to be the mayor or the city manager under 
a city manager form of government. The court said 
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that the definition in the statute did not really fit either 
the mayor or the manager, for although the manager 
was the chief executive as that term is generally under-
stood, he was not elected, and the mayor, although 
elected, was not the chief executive as that term is 
ordinarily used. The court held that the Legislature 
intended the mayor to be the appointing and serving 
power and said: 
"While it is the manager and not the mayor 
who is in the technical sense of the manager law 
the 'chief executive,' it is apparent the Legisla-
tive (sic) was using the term in the planning act 
in a broader connotation. It was seeking short 
language which would be applicable to all forms 
of local government and would tie in with the 
other criterion of 'elected official.' In fact, in 
most municipal forms- commission, borough, 
town, township-the mayor or other presiding 
officer (e.g., president of the board of trustees 
in villages, . . . ) is not 'the chief executive' at 
all, but legally only the titular head, whose 
powers are never full and vary greatly with the 
particular charter. He is 'the chief executive' 
solely in 'strong-mayor' plans, as under the 
Faulkner Act, N.J.S.A. 40:69 ..... £\.-39 et seq .... 
Consequently we are satisfied that the Legisla-
ture intended to put the appointing power in the 
mayor rather than in the manager." 
So also in this case the legislature in using the 
term "chief executive officer" was using merely a short-
hand expression that would be equally applicable to 
all types of govern1nent, and must have intended the 
mayor as the "chief executive officer" under the con1-
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lUission form of government. This conclusion is but-
tressed by the contemporaneous construction and the 
long-continued administrative practice without excep-
tion since the inception of the plaintiff district. Such 
construction and application is entitled to great weight 
as hertofore argued under Point I with authorities 
cited therein which will not be repeated in this point. 
Defendants' contentions respecting the estoppel of 
plaintiff argued under Point I are also equally appropos 
to defendants' contentions in this point as well and 
will likewise riot be repeated in this point. 
POINT III 
UNDER A.NY INTERPRETATION OF 
SECTION 73-8-20, U.C.A., 1953, TITLE 22 OF 
THE REVISED ORDIN.A.NCES OF SALT 
LAKE CITY, UTAH, 1955, IS VALID UNTIL 
REPEALED. 
Even if section 73-8-20, U.C.A., 1953, is construed 
in accordance with the reasoning of the trial court, still 
the court committed error in overturning the determi-
nation made by the governing body of Salt Lake City 
of the 1nethod of appointment. In other words the lower 
court adopted an inconsistent position. First it held 
that the governing body of Salt Lake City was to 
determine the appointment of the members of the 
board of directors of plaintiff, and then it declared in-
valid the solemn declaration that had been made by 
that self-same governing body of the method of exer-
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cise of that power. The court stated in its ruling as 
heretofore quoted that the Board of Commissioners 
had engrafted a "gratuitous procedural rule" on the 
statute and that such was invalid. If this is merely a 
gratuitous procedural rule to govern the procedure 
of the Board of Commissioners, it is difficult to see 
how it can be invalid, for under the trial court's reason-
ing, the power exists in the Board of Commissioners to 
determine the method of appointment. If the court 
intended to lay down a rule that the Board cannot 
determine the method but must act simultaneously, 
certainly such rule is unreasonable for an orderly pro-
cedure requires that someone must have the respon-
sibility for making the initial nomination to plaintiff's 
board. The entire Board of Commissioners cannot be 
expected to simultaneously place a single person in 
nomination. The procedure set out by the Board of 
Commissioners for appointment of directors to plain-
tiff district in Title 22 of the Revised Ordinances of 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 1955, is certainly a valid and 
proper exercise of the power and should be subject 
only to repeal or a new enactment by the Board of 
Commissioners. Since the original determination was 
made by ordinance, this determination can be modified 
or changed only by another ordinance. It cannot be 
repealed by any act with less dignity and forn1ality than 
the original ordinance. Rhyne, Municipal Law~ Section 
9-8, p. 234, citing Swindell v. State~ 143 Ind. 153, 42 
N.E. 528,35 L.R.A. 50 (1895); Coral Gables v. illiami~ 
138 Fla. 881, 190 So. 427 (1939); Litchfield v. Hart. 
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306 Ill. App. 621, 29 N.E. 2d 678 (1940); Stratton 
v. Warrensbttrg .. 237 Mo. App. 280, 167 S.W. 2d 392 
(1942); Tacoma v. Lillis .. 4 "rash. 797, 31 P. 321, 18 
L.R.A. 372 ( 1892). Title 22 under the trial court's 
interpretation of the statute should be valid until re-
pealed and the trial court erred in striking it down, 
even after reaching its conclusion respecting the method 
of appointment. 
POINT IV 
IN ANY EVENT THE APPOINTMENT 
OF THORPE B. ISAACSON IS A VALID AP-
POINTMENT. 
The action of the Salt Lake City Commission set 
out in the Statement of Facts reflecting the appoint-
ment of Thorpe B. Isaacson proves without any doubt 
that such appointment was regularly made by the 
Board of Commissioners at a regular meeting and is 
not subject to challenge under any interpretation of 
the statutes and ordinances. The argument of plaintiff 
accepted by the trial court to the effect that such ap-
pointment was not the free act of the Board of Com-
missioners, because they were laboring under an alleged 
erroneous interpretation of the law as set forth in the 
City Attorney's opinion dated .June 20, 1961, (Exhibit 
1, herein) is without merit. If the Board of Commis-
sioners were laboring under any mistake at all, it was 
a mistake of law and not a mistake of fact. The uni-
versal rule is that an act resulting from an erroneous 
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interpretation of law is not subject to correction by 
the courts. 19 American Jurisprudence~ Equity, Sec. 
63, p. 81; Ibid., Sec. 72, p. 87. If the solemn actions 
of governmental bodies are to be set aside every time 
they act upon erroneous advice, then there will be no 
stability at all in matters of business and commerce and 
government and no one will be able to rely upon the 
action of any deliberative body. In this case, if the 
Board of Commissioners had desired to question the 
validity of the interpretation of section 73-8-20 by the 
city attorney they could have done so easily by refusing 
to make any appointment at all to the board of directors 
of plaintiff until such time as that interpretation had 
been tested by the court. However, in this case they 
acted regularly and formally in approving the appoint-
ment of defendant Isaacson to plaintiff's Board of 
Directors and he should be seated forthwith by this 
court through the use of its power of mandamus. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should set aside the determination of the 
lower court that the first portion of Section 73-8-20 is 
not applicable to appointments to plaintiff, and should 
declare the law to be that nominations to plaintiff's 
board of directors are to be made by the Mayor as the 
chief executive officer of Salt Lake City, with the con-
sent and approval of the Board of Commissioners as 
the governing body in accordance with statute and 
ordinance. The court should also determine that de-
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fendant Thorpe B. Isaacson has been validly appointed 
and issue its writ of mandate to plaintiff directing it 
to seat defendant Isaacson on its board of directors 
forthwith. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOMER HOLMGREN 
City Attorney 
NORMAN W. KETTNER 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendants~ Apellants~ 
and Cross-Respondents 
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